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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE SPILL’S IMPACT ON THE GAP IN INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF OIL POLLUTION FROM FIXED
PLATFORMS
INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, the international community learned that the Gulf of
Mexico had endured1 what would ultimately become the world’s largest oil
spill in history2 and what President Barack Obama would describe as “the
worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.”3 British Petroleum’s
(“BP”) Deepwater Horizon oilrig had exploded off the coast of Louisiana,
killing eleven crewmembers.4 By the time BP was able to engineer a successful
means to cap the rig, eighty-six days had passed since the Deepwater Horizon
began to expel oil into the environment,5 and approximately 185 million
gallons of crude oil had escaped into the Gulf of Mexico and the surrounding
waters.6 Oil leaked continuously from BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig for
approximately three months, causing extensive damage to the environment and
devastating Gulf Coast tourism and fishing industries, especially those of
Florida and Louisiana.7
Although the Deepwater Horizon exploded off the coast of the United
States, hundreds of miles from any other country and with its greatest effects
on the economies and environments of the Gulf Coast states, oil spills have
traditionally been international concerns.8 Historically, due to sea currents’
abilities to easily transport oil slicks from their origin to neighboring countries’

1 Kate Galbraith, Gap in Rules on Oil Spills from Wells, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 17, 2010, at 20,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/business/energy-environment/17green.html.
2 Justin Gillis & Leslie Kaufman, Oil Spill Calculations Stir Debate on Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2010, at A16.
3 Justin Gillis, Where Gulf Spill Might Place on the Roll of Great Disasters, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010,
at A1.
4 Robbie Brown, Official Denies BP Put Cost Ahead of Safety at Oil Rig, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at
A12.
5 Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Caps Its Leaking Well, Stopping the Oil After 86 Days,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2010, at A1. The rig was finally capped on July 15, 2010. Id.
6 Elizabeth Wilson, Oil Spill’s Size Swells, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS, Sept. 27, 2010, at 14.
7 Id.
8 Galbraith, supra note 1.
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shores, states have recognized that oil spills involve important international
responsibilities concerning economic, environmental, and diplomatic
relations.9 For example, in 2009, a Thai-owned oil well leaked off the coast of
Australia, and caused a twenty-five mile by eighty-five mile oil slick that had
significant impacts on both Indonesia and East Timor.10 To direct the
international prevention and regulation of such international oil spills, states
have implemented multiple regional agreements and global conventions
through the formation of the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”).11
While an extensive body of international law concerning oil pollution12 has
emerged, a significant gap still exists in the international regulation of such
pollution. The current multilateral maritime conventions apply “primarily or
exclusively to accidents involving tankers,”13 failing to take into account
pollution from fixed platforms like the Deepwater Horizon. Moreover, while
two global conventions—addressed below in Part II.A.1—met in 1992 to
address the growing international implications and dangers of oil spills caused
by tankers,14 the international community has yet to establish a global
convention that specifically addresses the dangers of, and possible effective
regulations for, oil spills from fixed platforms.15
The conventions currently in force are therefore not applicable to accidents,
like the Deepwater Horizon disaster, which involve an explosion of or leak
from a fixed, offshore oil platform.16 Because “tankers move across
international boundaries all the time” and “platforms remain fixed in place,”
strict regulation of fixed platforms on an international scale has not yet been
9

Id.
Meraiah Foley, As Oil Enriches Australia, Spill Is Seen as a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, at
A6; see also Galbraith, supra note 1. For example, the spill “seriously affected” Indonesian fishermen when
the oil slick entered into their fishing grounds and negatively impacted their livelihood through a resulting lack
of catch. East Timor Wants Compo for Oil Spill Fallout, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2009, 7:15 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/11/05/2734579.htm.
11 Galbraith, supra note 1.
12 See infra Part I for the relevant conventions and agreements.
13 Galbraith, supra note 1; see also Yee Huang, International Law Implications of the BP Oil Spill,
CPRBLOG (June 9, 2010), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=FBF393AA-EE0A-FF0C695B9BA163B50BDB.
14 International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Jan. 15, 1993, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255 [hereinafter 1992
CLC]; International Maritime Organization Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Jan.
15, 1993, 1953 U.N.T.S. 373 [hereinafter 1992 Fund]; see also Galbraith, supra note 1.
15 Galbraith, supra note 1.
16 See id.; infra Part II.A.1.
10
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successfully achieved.17 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”)18 comes closest to regulating platform pollution by addressing
fixed platforms in its statutory language,19 but its strength, addressed in Part
I.B below, mainly rests in its “framework for international cooperation and its
attempt to harmonize standards,”20 rather than in its implementation of a
uniform, international liability standard.
In order to compensate for this lack of codified regulation of fixed platform
pollution, operators in the oil and shipping industries have created “private
compensation regimes” such as the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Funds (“IOPC”) and the Offshore Pollution Liability Association (“OPOL”).21
These operators have voluntarily bound themselves to regulations implemented
by private compensation regimes, which ensure that violators are held strictly
liable for any oil pollution emitted by their equipment.22 IOPC and OPOL
collect damages from the liable party and detail in their agreements exactly
how the injured parties may receive compensation.23 Importantly, however, the
agreements of both IOPC and OPOL place caps on the level of compensation
that the regimes can collect per party, per incident, and per year.24 Therefore, if
a party to IOPC or OPOL were to cause a spill that cost more than its relevant,
private compensation regime’s total liability limits, not all injured claimants
would be able to obtain their due compensations.
As is explained below, the current collection scheme of due compensations
for such accidents leaves victims injured by oil pollution at the mercy of either
private compensation regimes or those limited, international agreements

17

See Galbraith, supra note 1.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
19 Id. art. 194, para. 3.
20 See Huang, supra note 13.
21 See Introduction—The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, INT’L OIL POLLUTION
COMPENSATION FUNDS, http://www.iopcfund.org/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) [hereinafter IOPC
Introduction]; About OPOL, OPOL—OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIABILITY ASS’N LTD, http://www.opol.org.uk/
about.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011); SECRETARIAT OF THE INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, THE
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE—EXPLANATORY NOTE 1 (2011)
[hereinafter EXPLANATORY NOTE], available at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf.
22 See IOPC Introduction, supra note 21; About OPOL, supra note 21; EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note
21, at 1.
23 See IOPC Introduction, supra note 21; About OPOL, supra note 21; EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note
21, at 1.
24 See IOPC Introduction, supra note 21; About OPOL, supra note 21; EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note
21, at 1.
18
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currently in effect.25 This arrangement is deficient for two reasons. First,
compensation caps of private compensation regimes fail to encapsulate fully
the damages incurred by these disasters, forcing innocent victims in the
surrounding international environment to bear the remaining costs of repair
and revitalization.26 Second, the current international agreements fail to
address adequately pollution from fixed platforms.27 Therefore, it is important
to examine how best to fill this gap in international law so that those most
responsible and best able to absorb the cost of the accident will be held liable
for such damages; otherwise, the innocent consumer will be forced to shoulder
this undue burden.
In an effort to propose a solution that would alleviate this inadequacy, this
Comment evaluates this “gap” in international law and the degree to which it is
filled by private compensation regimes such as IOPC and OPOL. To this end,
this Comment examines the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s impact on the
current international agreements controlling oil pollution. As the largest oil
spill in history, the Deepwater Horizon explosion has put to the test the
effectiveness of compensation caps enacted by private compensation regimes
and reemphasized the importance of enacting a global convention on oil
pollution from fixed platforms. This Comment also examines the Deepwater
Horizon disaster’s impact on both private compensation regimes’ regulations
and liability caps, and on the international community’s recent reevaluation of
the importance of a global convention specifically addressing fixed platforms.
This Comment then argues that a global treaty—which addresses the
international implications of oil spills from fixed platforms and assigns liability
in a manner similar to those enforced by international conventions on tanker
pollution and similar, regional agreements—is the most logical solution to fill
this gap in international law and to create uniform, consistent liabilities
regulating such environmental disasters.
Part I summarizes the current status of relevant international laws that
govern both tanker and fixed platform oil spills, including the Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships28 and UNCLOS. Part II provides a

25

See infra Parts I–II.
See infra Part III.B.1.
27 See infra Part I.
28 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2, 1973, 1340
U.N.T.S. 184, modified by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships of November 2, 1973, opened for signature Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter
MARPOL 73/78].
26
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general overview of the two private compensation regimes mentioned above—
IOPC and OPOL—examines the changes that have been made to these regimes
over the decades, and questions the motivations behind these changes. Part III
analyzes the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s impact on both IOPC and OPOL
and their current, established frameworks for regulating the international
effects of oil pollution. It indicates that the Deepwater Horizon disaster has
already affected the agreements of OPOL, and has begun to alter opinions
concerning the need for a global treaty on fixed platform pollution. In addition,
Part III argues that the routine increases in the compensation caps that occur
after every major oil disaster in private compensation regimes simply do not
effectively regulate pollution by fixed platforms. It instead proposes that, in
light of the extensive Deepwater Horizon spill, a treaty—global in
jurisdiction—that imposes strict liability on operators of fixed platforms is
necessary to prevent, regulate, and maintain liability for such pollution.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW CURRENTLY
GOVERNING OIL POLLUTION
To effectively evaluate the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s impact on
international law, it is necessary to first understand the legal environment in
which this disaster occurred. Therefore, an examination of the relevant
international law currently addressing oil pollution from both ships and tankers
follows.
A. The International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
In 1973, the IMO promoted the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, and, in 1978, modified this convention with the
Protocol of 1978 (collectively, “MARPOL 73/78”).29 MARPOL 73/78
prohibits all “oil tankers, cruise ships, general cargo and container vessels,
tugs, ferries, yachts and small pleasure craft” from releasing substances that
would pollute the marine environment.30 Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 regulates
the discharge of oil and allows a port state, upon detecting a violation, to detain

29 Id.; see also John R. Lethbridge, MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships) (Transp., Water & Urban Dev. Dep’t, World Bank, Transport No. PS-4, 1991), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRANSPORT/Resources/336291-1119275973157/td-ps4.pdf.
30 See Lethbridge, supra note 29.
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the violating ship until it is found to comply with MARPOL 73/78.31
Currently, 150 states are parties to MARPOL 73/78.32
Enforcement of MARPOL 73/78 has proven difficult, however, because
this convention lacks provisions that specifically detail how a port state may
detain an offending ship.33 Additionally, certain jurisdictional issues further
attenuate MARPOL 73/78’s enforceability.34 For example, port and coastal
states affected by a violating ship merely have the authority to inform a flag
state of its ship’s violation; flag states, however, are averse to prosecuting their
own ships for MARPOL violations.35 IMO has recognized this significant
ineffectiveness, as is witnessed in flag states’ lack of convictions of reported
ships.36 Therefore, due to its weak enforceability provisions, MARPOL 73/78
does not provide a strong mechanism under which international oil disasters
like the Deepwater Horizon can be regulated.
B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
In addition to MARPOL, states are also bound by UNCLOS, which is
directly applicable to disasters like the Deepwater Horizon spill. In 1994,
UNCLOS came into force.37 To date, 156 countries have ratified the treaty.38
The United States is not a party to the convention,39 but many of UNCLOS’

31

See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28, Annex I, reg. 4, para. 3(d); see also Rebecca Becker, Note,
MARPOL 73/78: An Overview in International Environmental Enforcement, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
625, 628–29 (1998).
32 See INT’L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF CONVENTIONS SUMMARY (2011), http://www.imo.org/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Summary%20of%20Status.xls. The United States is one of
these parties. Id.
33 See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28, Annex I, reg. 4, para. 3(d); see also Becker, supra note 31, at 629.
MARPOL simply states that the “Port State . . . shall take such steps as will ensure that the ship shall not sail
until it can proceed to sea or leave the port for the purpose of proceeding to the nearest appropriate repair yard
available without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.” MARPOL 73/78,
supra note 28, Annex I, reg. 4, para. 3(d).
34 MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28; see also Becker, supra note 31, at 631.
35 See Becker, supra note 31, at 631, 632–33; MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28.
36 Becker, supra note 31, at 633 (“[O]ut of 1000 alleged violations that were reported to the IMO, 534
represented situations in which the flag states had not complied with this notification requirement. Of the 206
cases that reported some type of action taken, 111 found the vessel innocent or unprosecutable due to
insufficient evidence. Seventy-seven of the cases resulted in fines, eight resulted in warnings, and ten resulted
in unspecified actions.” (citations omitted)).
37 Scott J. Shackelford, Was Selden Right? The Expansion of Closed Seas and Its Consequences, 47
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (2011).
38 Huang, supra note 13.
39 Id.
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provisions are considered customary international law;40 this fact thus provides
the very avenue by which nonparties such as the United States can be bound.41
Therefore, because UNCLOS’ customs are accepted as binding international
law, these provisions can bind even those countries, including the United
States, that have not ratified the convention.
Article 194 of UNCLOS requires that ratifying countries “take all measures
necessary to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment
from any source” and “ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control
are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment.”42 Although UNCLOS’ pollution articles predominantly discuss
the regulation of oil pollution from vessels,43 Article 194(3) importantly lists as
under its control these “installations and devices used in exploration or
exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil,”44 and this
definition therefore includes the Deepwater Horizon as one of the convention’s
regulated facilities. In an attempt to ensure compliance from ratifying
countries, UNCLOS mandates that these countries “adopt laws or regulations
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising
from or in connection with sea-bed activities”45 and further states that such
laws “shall be no less effective than international rules, standards, and
recommended practices and procedures.”46
Although UNCLOS directly addresses international regulation of fixed,
offshore drilling platforms like the Deepwater Horizon, and thus is the most
comprehensive, current international treaty for oil pollution, its weakness lies
in that it merely requires states to pass domestic laws that will monitor fixed
platform pollution.47 It therefore “lacks definitive procedures for determining
liability, guaranteeing compensation, and enforcing the adoption of
international rules” if a spill or explosion, caused by one state and affecting

40 Id. Customary international law is “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” DAVID J.
BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 16 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]).
41 ICJ Statute, supra note 40; see BEDERMAN, supra note 40, at 16.
42 UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 194(1)–(2).
43 See Melissa B. Cates, Comment, Offshore Oil Platforms Which Pollute the Marine Environment: A
Proposal for an International Treaty Imposing Strict Liability, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 691, 695–96 (1984).
44 UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 194(3)(c).
45 Id. art. 208
46 Id.
47 Id.
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another state, were to occur.48 Unlike MARPOL,49 UNCLOS does not provide
coastal or port states with any jurisdiction over pollution matters or with any
other, specific rights to act upon or report to an international regulatory body if
violations stemming from a fixed platform should affect a neighboring state.50
UNCLOS, instead, relies solely on domestic laws, which are implemented by
individual states and coupled with the international cooperation of those states,
to enforce its provisions.51
Additionally, because UNCLOS leaves the codification of these laws to the
discretion of individual state governments, it fails to provide adequately for a
defined, international pollution standard or an international enforcement body
that would establish whether these domestic laws sufficiently regulate
international oil pollution.52 As scholar Barney T. Levantino states, “an
effective regime to prevent pollution of the oceans requires, in addition to the
imposition of obligations on parties that use the oceans, the establishment of an
authority to enforce these obligations with respect to violations which occur
outside the jurisdiction of any particular state.”53 Without an international
regulatory body or defined standard of pollution, the responsibility to regulate
pollution from platforms is placed on individual states, with independent
regulatory schemes, and thus the international cooperation for which UNCLOS
strives is lost.54 Therefore, although UNCLOS is progressive in globally
addressing the increasing prevalence of offshore drilling (and its potentially
large impact on oil pollution), it yet lacks the specificity in international
regulation and punishment to be a viable international treaty with the power to
cover adequately pollution from fixed platforms.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE COMPENSATION REGIMES
Although this legal background is instructive in understanding state
liability for pollution, it is also important to look to the pertinent, private
compensation regimes that were in place at the time of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. This Comment discusses below the implementation and subsequent
48

Cates, supra note 43, at 694.
See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 28, Annex I.
50 For UNCLOS’ implementation of domestic remedies as opposed to a single, comprehensive
international standard, see UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 208.
51 Id. arts. 208(1), (5); see Huang, supra note 13.
52 Cates, supra note 43, at 694.
53 Barney T. Levantino, Protection of the High Seas from Operational Oil Pollution: A Proposal, 6
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 72, 89 (1982).
54 See Cates, supra note 43, at 695.
49
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historical development of both the private compensation regime for vessels—
IOPC—and the private compensation regime for fixed platforms and offshore
drilling—OPOL. To facilitate an understanding of the Deepwater Horizon’s
effect on private compensation regimes, this Comment first details the specific
agreements and regulations of each private compensation regime.
A. The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds
1. Structure and Function of IOPC
The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds is a private
compensation regime that, in the event of an oil spill from a vessel, imposes a
liability scheme on its member organizations.55 It originated from two
international conventions: the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution (the “1969 CLC”) and the 1971 International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage (the “1971 Fund”).56 The 1969 CLC covered pollution damage that
occurred only in the territory or territorial sea of a party state and limited its
scope to pollution from tankers.57 It capped liability at either $201 per ship’s
tonnage or $21.2 million, whichever amount was lower.58 The 1971 Fund
provided for $95 million in total compensation for victims of such pollution.59
This liability constituted funds covered by both the ship owner and the 1971
Fund.60
These conventions were subsequently amended in 1992 with two
protocols—the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (the “1992 CLC”) and the
1992 Fund Convention (the “1992 Fund”).61 Following the advent of these
protocols, many states signed the 1992 CLC and subsequently denounced the
1969 CLC, and, in May of 2002, the 1971 Fund ceased to be enforceable
55

IOPC Introduction, supra note 21.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted Nov. 29, 1969, 973
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1969 CLC]; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, adopted Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter 1971
Fund]; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 1.
57 1969 CLC, supra note 56, arts. II, III(1). The convention defines “ship” as “any sea-going vessel and
any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo.” Id. art. I(1); see also
EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7.
58 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7.
59 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7.
60 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7.
61 1992 CLC, supra note 14; 1992 Fund, supra note 14; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at
1.
56
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against its parties.62 The 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund, which entered into force in
1996, established IOPC for compensation for pollution from vessels.63 IOPC
draws its financing from any person who received more than 150,000 tons of
crude and contributing oil from a state that is a party to the 1992 CLC.64
The 1992 CLC holds its ship owners strictly liable for oil pollution caused
by their vessels.65 In other words, even if a ship owner is not found to be at
fault, the 1992 CLC will hold that person liable for the tanker’s damage,
absent: (1) an act of war or natural disaster, (2) third party sabotage, or (3)
negligence by public authorities in maintaining navigational aids.66 Because
liability is calculated proportionally to the tonnage of the offending ship, the
extent to which an individual ship owner may be held liable is limited.67
Additionally, the 1992 CLC is more expansive than its predecessors because it
applies to damage that occurs in a member state’s territory, territorial sea, or
exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”).68 A ship owner is therefore now potentially
liable to a member state up to 200 nautical miles from the coast of any member
state.69
The 1992 Fund established IOPC to satisfy damage claims from tanker
pollution that a party state may suffer but that the 1992 CLC cannot fully
compensate under its liability caps.70 Such partial compensation can arise
under the 1992 CLC as a result of any of the following conditions: (1) the ship
owner has invoked one of the exemptions under the 1992 CLC,71 (2) the ship
62 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 8. Ninety-eight states have signed both the 1992 CLC and the
1992 Fund, and nineteen states are members of the 1992 CLC but not the 1992 Fund. Id.
63 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. XXVII(2); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3.
64 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. XII; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5.
65 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. IV; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2. The 1969 CLC
defines a ship owner as

a person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of registration, the
person or persons owning the ship. However, in the case of a ship owned by a State and operated
by a company which in that State is registered as the ship’s operator, “owner” shall mean such
company.
1969 CLC, supra note 56, art. I(3).
66 1992 CLC, supra note 14, arts. IV(2)–(3); see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2.
67 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. VI; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2.
68 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 2. The EEZ was not
included in the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund’s jurisdiction. See 1969 CLC, supra note 56, arts. II, III.
69 For a definition of the EEZ, see UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 55–57.
70 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3.
71 These exemptions arise when an owner can prove that the damage resulted from: (1) “an act of war,
hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible
character,” (2) “an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party,” or (3) “the negligence
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owner, with his insurance, is unable to financially repay the damages
demanded of him, or (3) the damage has exceeded the ship owner’s liability
under the 1992 CLC based on the violating ship’s total tonnage.72 Prior to
November 1, 2003, the 1992 Fund capped ship owners’ total liability at $204.5
million.73 On November 1, 2003, the 1992 Fund was prospectively amended,
with a more than fifty percent increase in compensation, to include a more
comprehensive liability cap of $307.5 million in total liability.74
In March of 2005, the 1992 Fund again increased states’ available funds
when the IOPC implemented the 2003 Supplemental Fund (the “Supplemental
Fund”).75 Parties to the 1992 CLC were also given the option to enter into this
additional, supplemental monetary resource.76 If a party agreed to contribute to
the Supplemental Fund, that fund would, in turn, further increase a party’s total
liability to approximately $1.2 billion per incident.77 Despite this substantial
increase in liability, states still have the same incentive to sign the
Supplemental Fund as would have motivated them to join the 1992 CLC and
the 1992 Fund:
If a pollution incident occurs involving a tanker, compensation is
available to governments or other authorities which have incurred
costs for clean-up operations or preventive measures and to private
bodies or individuals who have suffered damage as a result of the
pollution . . . provided that the damage is suffered within a State
78
Party.

or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.” 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III(2); see also supra note 58
and accompanying text.
72 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3.
73 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. VI; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3.
74 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3.
75 Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, May 16, 2003, reprinted in INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS,
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CONVENTIONS AND THE
SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 53–68 (2005) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL FUND], available at www.
iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English.pdf ; see also EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5.
76 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5.
77 SUPPLEMENTAL FUND, supra note 75, art. IV(2); see also CLC and Fund Convention, ITOPF,
http://www.itopf.com/spill-compensation/clc-fund-convention (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). This $1.2 billion
includes the amounts available under the 1992 CLC. See id.
78 EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 7.
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To date, twenty-one state parties are members of the Supplemental Fund.79
Additionally, as of the September 2010 date of the IOPC Secretariat’s report,
no party has requested to withdraw compensatory funds from the Supplemental
Fund.80
Importantly, the Supplemental Fund is strictly a supplement to the 1992
Fund. It continues to cover the same accidents and events that the 1992 Fund
already covers—namely pollution by tankers and other vessels.81 Therefore,
because the explosion involved oil pollution from an offshore platform and not
a vessel, victims of the Deepwater Horizon disaster are not eligible to obtain
funds from the Supplemental Fund.
2. Amendments to IOPC Protocols Prior to the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster
From its inception and throughout its history, IOPC’s liability caps have
been amended in response to each major tanker disaster. This repeated action,
evidenced in the historical analysis below, reflects the IOPC conventions’
constant inability to properly compensate victims of large-scale tanker
pollution. As discussed previously in Part II.A.1, IOPC originally derived from
the 1969 and 1971 pollution liability conventions. Prior to 1969, a vessel’s
tonnage governed a ship owner’s total liability for damage caused by oil
pollution.82 In 1967, the Torrey Canyon, a British Petroleum supertanker
carrying 119,000 tons of crude oil, shipwrecked off the coast of England.83 As
the largest shipwreck of its time, costing approximately $23 million, the Torrey
Canyon disaster surpassed the compensation scheme laid out in the
contemporary treaty’s tonnage-liability rules84 and quickly became the catalyst

79 These parties are Barbados, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. See EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 10.
80 Id. at 5.
81 SUPPLEMENTAL FUND, supra note 75, at 3.
82 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships art. iii,
done Oct. 10, 1957, [1981] A.T.S. 2 [hereinafter 1957 Convention]; see also Michael Faure & Wang Hui, The
International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EURO.
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVIRO. L. 242, 242 (2003).
83 CONG. OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OIL TRANSPORTATION BY TANKERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF MARINE POLLUTION AND SAFETY MEASURES 1, 34, 285 (1975).
84 Id. at 286.
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for the first major, reactive change in liability caps—the creation of the 1969
and 1971 conventions and the IOPC compensation regime.85
Then, in 1978, the Amoco Cadiz spill revealed the 1969 CLC and 1971
Fund’s “ineffective and inadequate” handling of “major oil spill[s].”86 The
American-owned Amoco Cadiz sank off the coast of France and released 1.6
million barrels of oil and affected approximately 125 miles of French
coastline.87 It became the largest oil spill to date, and the disaster caused
damages reportedly valued at around $282 million.88 The 1969 and 1971
conventions covered liability up to only $95 million,89 and thus, within ten
years of their drafting, these conventions proved highly inadequate in
responding to the exact disasters they were written to cover. The accident led
to the drafting of 1984 protocols that again increased liability limits.90 These
amendments never entered into force, however, because they were contingent
upon the participation of the United States.91 The United States disagreed with
the 1984 amendments’ versions of limited liability and therefore declined to
sign the protocols; thus, this next reactive mechanism was rendered
ineffective.92
In 1991, the Cypriot-owned Amoco Milford Haven, carrying nearly a
million barrels of oil, exploded off the coast of northern Italy.93 Six Cypriot
crewmembers were killed, and approximately 290,000 barrels of oil escaped
into the Mediterranean Sea, affecting both Italy and France.94 Following both

85 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 243; Agustin Blanco-Bazan, The Erika Casualty, Legal Issues from the
IMO View 2 (International Union of Marine Insurance 2000 Conference, London, Liability Workshop Paper,
2000). Blanco-Bazan states that, as a result of the Torrey Canyon disaster, the IMO realized the “need to adopt
a treaty containing international public law rules to regulate the right of the coastal State to intervene in the
high seas in cases of serious shipping accidents involving pollution damage caused by oil and other hazardous
and noxious substances” and that “a private law treaty [was] also needed in order to regulate a global liability
and compensation regime for victims of oil pollution damage.” Id.
86 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 245.
87 The World’s Worst Oil Disasters: 8. Amoco Cadiz, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/36851250/The_
World_s_Worst_Oil_Disasters?slide=4 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
88 Spill Compensation: Cost of Spills, ITOPF, http://www.itopf.com/spill-compensation/cost-of-spills
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
89 1969 CLC, supra note 56, art. V(1); 1971 Fund, supra note 56, art. V(1); see also EXPLANATORY
NOTE, supra note 21, at 7.
90 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 245.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 The World’s Worst Oil Disasters: 10. M/T Haven, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/36851250/The_
World_s_Worst_Oil_Disasters?slide=2 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
94 Id.
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the Haven and Amoco Cadiz disasters, the European members of IOPC again
demanded higher liability caps so that they would be protected from disasters
like these, which were proving more internationally prevalent.95 The regime
responded with the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund, which were almost identical in
substance and function to the 1984 protocols, except that these newer protocols
lacked the prior, conditional cooperation of the United States.96 The 1992
protocols continued to impose strict liability on ship owners, and this liability,
linked to tonnage, could reach up to $76.5 million.97
Finally, in 2000, IOPC reacted to the Nakhodka and Erika spills, discussed
immediately below, and thus implemented the final changes to its protocols
before the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.98 In 1997, a Russian-owned
vessel, the Nakhodka, wrecked off the coast of Japan and dispersed
approximately 50,000 tons of oil.99 Clean-up claims alone reached $86 million,
and total pollution and economic damages have not yet been finalized.100 Only
two years later, Italy’s Erika spilled over 20,000 tons of oil and polluted
approximately 250 miles of French coastline.101 Although the exact level of
damages has not been calculated, the French oil company, Total, has already
been assessed approximately $500,000 for negligent maintenance of the
ship.102 Final damage estimates are expected to exceed compensation available
under the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund.103 Responding to these extensive
pollution incidents, IOPC increased the total liability of an individual party
under the 1992 CLC and Fund by another fifty percent,104 rendering parties
strictly liable for up to $115 million in compensation damages for oil pollution
from tankers.105

95

Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 246.
Id.
97 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. 6(1); see Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 246.
98 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 247.
99 T.H. MOLLER, THE NAKHODKA OIL SPILL RESPONSE—THE TECHNICAL ADVISER’S PERSPECTIVE 1, 4
(1997), available at http://www.itopf.com/_assets/documents/paj_97.pdf.
100 Id. at 6.
101 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 247; Total Guilty of French Oil Spill, BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7192085.stm.
102 Paris Appeals Court Upholds Total Conviction for 1999 ‘Erika’ Oil Spill, FRANCE24 (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.france24.com/en/20100330-paris-appeals-court-upholds-total-conviction-1999-erika-oil-spill.
103 See 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. 6, paras. 1.1(a)–(b); EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 3
(describing the total liability caps granted under the 1992 protocols); Spill Compensation: Cost of Spills, supra
note 88.
104 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 247.
105 See id.
96

SMITH GALLEYSFINAL2

2011]

3/21/2012 8:19 AM

THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER

1491

Additionally, to combat the continual deficit in compensation liability
funds that disasters like the Nakhodka and Erika spills have unveiled, the
European Commission developed an additional, third-tier fund known as the
Compensation for Oil Pollution in Europe.106 The IMO subsequently adopted
this model as an opt-in fund for IOPC to supplement the liability caps under
the current protocols.107 Because it is voluntary and applies only to those
parties that ratify it, this third-tier fund does not directly affect the 1992 CLC
and 1992 Fund.108
Therefore, based on the above historical review, it is clear that IOPC is a
“reactive” private compensation regime.109 Its protocols have been “amended
after each new incident” to meet the ever-escalating compensation demands of
those who have been injured by increasingly “greater oil spills.”110 These
repeated and reactive amendments have led scholars to question the overall
validity and effectiveness of liability caps in private compensation regimes, a
topic that is discussed in Part III.B.1.
B. The Offshore Pollution Liability Association
1. Structure and Function of OPOL
Just as individual states have signed onto IPOC to better regulate pollution
from tankers, the international community has also established OPOL as a
means to control pollution from fixed platforms.111 OPOL is an indefinite and
voluntary compensation regime that regulates liability for oil pollution caused
by offshore facilities.112 OPOL’s definition of “offshore facility” includes
wells, drilling units, platforms, offshore storage/loading systems, and pipelines,
yet excludes any “abandoned well, installation or pipeline; or any ship, barge
or other craft not being used for the storage of Oil.”113 Its agreement covers
106 Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Establishment of a Fund for the Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage in European Waters and Related
Measures, 2002 O.J. (C277) [hereinafter Amended Proposal]; see also Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 248.
107 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 248 (explaining that liability caps under this third-tier fund span from
approximately $5.78 million to the maximum cap of $115 million); see also Amended Proposal, supra note
106.
108 Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 248.
109 Id. at 249.
110 Id.
111 About OPOL, supra note 21.
112 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (2010), http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-agreementoct10.pdf [hereinafter OPOL Agreement]; see also About OPOL, supra note 21.
113 About OPOL, supra note 21; see also OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. I(8).
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offshore facilities located in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, France,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, and the Faroe Islands,114
and it limits its jurisdiction to facilities located within the jurisdiction of these
states.115 OPOL retains jurisdiction over pollution should it disperse from a
facility within its jurisdiction to an area outside the seas of the nine countries
listed above, so long as the facility is located within a party state’s
jurisdiction.116
Importantly, OPOL does not create a contractual agreement among
states.117 Instead, it creates a contract among current and future operators of
offshore facilities maintained for the exploration or production of oil and
gas.118 Two types of claimants may bring suit against an operator: (1) a “Public
Authority” (a government, local, or municipal authority) may request
compensation for remedial costs incurred during pollution prevention,
mitigation, or elimination measures, and (2) any other party (including a Public
Authority) may bring a claim for “direct loss or damage caused by
contamination,” excluding damage to the offending facility.119 OPOL,
therefore, fashions a means by which entities injured by oil pollution caused by
an offshore facility can file claims directly against the operators of those
facilities.120 The agreement mandates that all claims be filed within one year of
any offending event and that the injured claimant and violating party arbitrate
all arising disputes in London.121

114

OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. I(4).
About OPOL, supra note 21.
116 Id.
117 Id.; see also Kissi Agyebeng, Disappearing Acts—Toward a Global Civil Liability Regime for
Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration, CORNELL L. STUDENT PAPERS 1, 27
(2006).
118 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, pmbl. (stating that “the Parties to this Contract are Operators of or
intend to be the Operators of Offshore Facilities used in connection with exploration for or production of oil
and gas”); see also About OPOL, supra note 21; Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 27. OPOL Agreement defines
an operator as
115

a Person which by agreement with other Persons has been authorized to manage, conduct, and
control the operation of an Offshore Facility, subject to the terms and conditions of said
agreement, or which manages, conducts and controls the operation of an Offshore Facility in
which only it has an interest.
OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. I(10).
119 About OPOL, supra note 21.
120 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 27; see About OPOL, supra note 21.
121 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cls. IX, XI.
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Like IOPC, OPOL holds operators strictly liable for damage caused by
their offshore facilities.122 Again, this strict liability ensures that an operator’s
liability remains in all instances except for those caused by: (1) an act of war,
(2) negligence by a third party with the intent to cause damage, (3) negligence
by a state, or (4) contributory negligence by the claimant.123 The OPOL
Agreement currently caps any party’s liability at $250 million per incident,124
and divides this $250-million limit into two subgroups: (1) a $125-million cap
for remedial damages that can be claimed only by Public Authorities, and (2) a
$125-million cap for pollution damages.125 The agreement provides for the
possibility of utilizing any surplus from either subgroup to buttress an
overpayment in the other.126 For example, if an incident caused $150 million in
damages due to Public Authorities and only $75 million for pollution damage,
such an accident would still be fully covered under OPOL. Public Authorities
can receive up to $125 million “plus that portion, if any, of the maximum
amount referred to in sub-paragraph 2 [pollution damage] which, under the
circumstances of the Incident, is not in fact due hereunder.”127 Therefore, the
$50 million surplus from pollution damages in the aforementioned example
could be applied to the Public Authorities subgroup to help pay out relief funds
to victims. Additionally, the agreement mandates that a party pay no more than
$500 million per year in claims.128 If a party fails to pay any claim required by
OPOL, the remaining parties to OPOL must contribute to the unresolved claim
in an amount proportionate to the number of offshore facilities it operates.129
OPOL’s agreements are enforceable through Article IX and XI’s exclusive
arbitration provisions.130 Arbitration must occur in London and all disputes are
“settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said
rules.”131 OPOL’s main weakness is that it caps liability at $250 million per
incident. As will be shown below utilizing the Deepwater Horizon disaster’s
122

Id. cl. IV(A); About OPOL, supra note 21.
OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. IV(B); About OPOL, supra note 21.
124 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cl. IV(A).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 About OPOL, supra note 21; OIL & GAS UK, MANDATORY FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OIL
INDUSTRY OPERATIONS IN THE UKCS 3, available at http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/templates/asset-relay.cfm?
frmAssetFileID=1170.
129 About OPOL, supra note 21; OIL & GAS UK, supra note 128.
130 OPOL Agreement, supra note 112, cls. 9, 11.
131 Id. cl. 9.
123
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damage statistics and calculations,132 oil pollution from fixed platforms can be
even more costly, and as internationally important, as that from tankers. With
each new, major oil disaster and the subsequent international effects, pollution
damages will simply exceed compensation caps and require repeated
amendments to liability limits to compensate effectively those injured by the
pollution. Additionally, OPOL’s limited jurisdiction, covering pollution caused
only by offshore facilities located in those countries listed above,133 weakens
OPOL’s overall international effectiveness. As will be asserted below,134
especially in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill, a more comprehensive,
internationally applicable liability scheme for offshore pollution is necessary to
regulate and prevent major environmental and economic disasters like the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
2. Amendments to the OPOL Agreement
OPOL’s amendments,135 like those of the IOPC protocols, also indicate the
“reactive” nature of private compensation regimes to major oil disasters. As is
examined again in Part III.A below, OPOL, prior to the Deepwater Horizon’s
explosion off the coast of Louisiana, limited a party’s liability to only $120
million per incident.136 In an August 2010 emergency meeting in response to
the Deepwater Horizon incident,137 parties to OPOL amended OPOL’s
agreement to reflect a new, higher liability cap of $250 million per party per
offshore oil pollution incident.138 Additionally, OPOL added the current annual
cap of $500 million per party.139 Similarly to the amendments to the IOPC
protocols, these changes—which took effect in October of 2010140—were
therefore “reactive” to the salient and far-reaching effects of the Deepwater
Horizon explosion.

132

See infra Parts III.A–.B.
About OPOL, supra note 21.
134 See infra Part III.D.
135 1969 CLC, supra note 52, art. V(1); 1971 Fund, supra note 52, art. V(1); 1992 CLC, supra note 14,
art. VI(1).
136 Humphrey Douglas, United Kingdom: Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Likely Impact on UK Regulation and
Contractual Arrangements, MONDAQ (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=113370.
137 ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE COMM., UK DEEPWATER DRILLING—IMPLICATIONS OF THE GULF OF
MEXICO OIL SPILL, 2010-1 H.C. 450-I, at 4.5.3 (U.K).
138 Id.
139 OIL & GAS UK, supra note 128, at 3.
140 Id.
133
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III. ANALYSIS: DEEPWATER HORIZON’S EFFECT ON THE GAP IN
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF OFFSHORE DRILLING FACILITIES
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster, although the most severe oil spill in
history—and one of the most widely publicized—has still managed to lodge
itself in the gap in international regulation of offshore platform pollution. Both
IOPC and OPOL fail to adequately address the damage already caused by the
Deepwater Horizon. In addition, the detrimental impacts and the resulting
pollution that the spill will continue to have on the ecology, tourism, and
economy of the Gulf Coast states have begun to affect the regulation and
administration of these compensation regimes. Thus, both IOPC and OPOL
must substantially alter their structures and agreements if they hope to combat
potential similar disasters.
Importantly, the Deepwater Horizon disaster impacted approximately
68,000 square miles of ocean, roughly comparable in size to the state of
Oklahoma.141 This far-reaching disaster has caused international scholars and
lawyers, envisioning potentially greater disasters, to question the adequacy of
the current international regulation of pollution from fixed, offshore
platforms.142 In response to this concern, private compensation regimes, which
are reactive in nature, have altered their compensation schemes, and the
general attitude toward the value of a global treaty on the subject has also
begun to shift.143 This Comment examines the effects the Deepwater Horizon
spill has had on this gap in international law and projects its future effects on
international regulations of pollution from fixed platforms. Additionally, it
argues that a global treaty that would impose strict liability on operators for oil
spills from fixed platforms is necessary to regulate both liability and due
compensation fully and effectively.
A. The Deepwater Horizon’s Direct, Evidenced Effects on Private
Compensation Regimes
Currently the largest oil spill to date, the Deepwater Horizon disaster has
impacted more than just ecologies, environments, tourism industries, and
economies. It has also begun to affect the agreements of private compensation
regimes, and these modifications to the affairs of private compensation regimes
141 Justin Gillis, An Oil Slick To Rival Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2010, 1:28 PM), http://green.
blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/an-oil-slick-to-rival-oklahoma.
142 See, e.g., Huang, supra note 13.
143 See id.
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elucidate the greater, long-term impact that the Deepwater Horizon incident
will likely have on both IOPC and OPOL. Both IOPC and OPOL have
historically been reactive when responding to each major oil pollution disaster,
simply updating their protocols and regulations concerning liability caps rather
than by reevaluating the effect of their regimes.144 With each new and more
costly accident, these protocols quickly become outdated and insufficient;145
the respective member parties then demand further increased liability caps to
better cover the escalating damages.146 These historically “reactive” efforts,
therefore, reveal private compensation regimes’ heightened, but ultimately
ineffective, efforts to keep up with the increasingly costly damages incurred
because of larger tankers and platforms that hold ever-greater quantities of oil.
For example, in an attempt to mitigate the overwhelming damage caused by
the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP allocated $20 billion to finance a relief
fund to aid those affected by the disaster.147 Twenty billion dollars from one
party for one incident far exceeded any caps in place by either IOPC or OPOL
at the time of the disaster. In April 2010, IOPC capped liability for its parties at
$307.5 million, with an optional fund that totaled liability at $1.2 billion for
those who chose to enter into the Supplemental Fund.148 When the Deepwater
Horizon exploded, OPOL had limited a party’s liability to only $120 million
per party, per incident.149 Responding to the Gulf Coast spill, OPOL’s board
held an emergency meeting in August 2010 to discuss increasing liability caps
to $250 million per party, per incident and $500 million per party aggregated
per year for fixed platform pollution.150 The board subsequently approved the
caps, and, in October 2010, they entered into force.151
Although the recent increases in both IOPC and OPOL caps reveal that
IOPC and OPOL are reactive regarding large-scale disasters, these caps pale in
comparison to the $20-billion relief fund which BP has agreed to finance.
History has shown that these simple increases fail to cure the ever-impending
problem of insufficient liability available under private compensation regimes.
144

See supra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
See id.
146 See id.
147 BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend
Decisions, BP (June 16, 2010), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=
7062966.
148 See EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 21, at 5; supra text accompanying notes 21, 73.
149 See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
150 ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE COMM., supra note 137, at 4.5.3.
151 OIL & GAS UK, supra note 128.
145
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With each historical disaster that surpasses the current cap, as evidenced by the
Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, and Erika spills, and now the Deepwater
Horizon explosion, the liability schemes of these private compensation regimes
are inevitably rendered outdated, sometimes before even entering into force,152
and then are immediately ripe for amendment.
B. The Deepwater Horizon Disaster’s Potential Effects on Private
Compensation Regimes
1. A Proposed Model Eliminating Compensation Caps
The degree to which the BP compensation fund exceeds the current liability
caps of IOPC and OPOL153 calls into question the feasibility of liability caps
for oil pollution from tankers and fixed platforms.154 Economists argue that,
under limited liability principles, violators are not provided with an
“appropriate (economic) incentive for prevention” of environmental disasters
like the Deepwater Horizon explosion.155 Compensation caps on damages
leave vessel and platform operators less than entirely accountable for their
actions.156 If operators can avoid part of the cost of their negligence or
mismanagement of facilities, the balance of costs for these operators therefore
often can weigh in favor of limiting precautionary measures rather than
vigilantly monitoring their facilities and relevant safety regulations.157
One proposal economists recommend for alleviating this problem is for
private compensation regimes to simply remove all compensation caps.158 By
eliminating these liability limits, private compensation regimes would hold
parties fully responsible for all damage they incur and would no longer force
victims to bear the difference between total damages caused by the operator’s
pollution and total compensation allowed under the regime. This proposal also
retains a mandate that installation owners maintain compulsory insurance.159
Therefore, if a violating party does not have sufficient assets to completely
152

Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 251.
Although the IOPC Fund does not directly regulate fixed platforms, its model for compensation is
instructive for future changes in private oil pollution compensation regimes. For a discussion of IOPC and
OPOL’s liability caps, see supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
154 See Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 249.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
153
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satisfy a claim, the party’s insurance company must remit the remaining
payment.160 Advocates of this proposal argue that, by implementing these
safeguards, a total elimination of compensation caps would successfully
encourage oil operators to regulate their vessels and platforms responsibly
because parties would be fully, rather than only partially, responsible for any
damage caused by their facilities.161
As noted above, BP has financed a $20-billion relief fund to compensate
those injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster.162 This amount far exceeds
IOPC’s $1.2-billion supplemental cap and OPOL’s newly approved $250million cap.163 The Deepwater Horizon explosion, originating from a fixed
platform, is most analogous to a disaster governed under OPOL’s
guidelines;164 the difference between OPOL’s $250-million cap and BP’s $20billion relief fund is stunning. This readily apparent, eightyfold discrepancy
very likely will cause economists, environmentalists, and other influential
advocates to reconsider seriously both the efficacy of the caps placed on
operators by these private compensation regimes and the ability of these
regimes to compensate victims adequately. It is unlikely, however, that private
compensation regimes will, as this model recommends, completely eliminate
compensation caps. Instead, evidence from past oil pollution disasters supports
the less effective, but more probable, outcome of a continuation in the
escalation of liability limits for operators of both tankers and fixed platforms—
but possibly at a higher percentage increase than past amendments in light of
BP’s $20-billion compensation fund.165
2. A Possible Change in “Abstract Claims”
In addition to exposing the need for a possible modification in
compensation caps, the Deepwater Horizon incident highlights the need to
allow “abstract claims” in a demand for compensation from offending
operators. The 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund restrict the ability of those injured
by a party to the CLC so that they may recover only for environmental
damages of “reasonable measures of reinstatement, either undertaken or to be

160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 252.
Id. at 249.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 77, 124.
See supra Parts II.A.1 and II.B.1.
See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
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undertaken.”166 Therefore, the 1992 CLC covers only those claims in which
injured parties can allege that they sustained a “quantifiable economic loss”
that must be compensated in order to restore the environment.167 Under the
1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund, injured victims cannot recover compensation
from violating operators for the “abstract claims” of irreparable harm to the
environment, including the loss of the use and enjoyment of the land and the
decrease in the monetary valuation of the environment.168
In light of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, private compensation regimes
like IOPC and OPOL may reevaluate their decision to deny compensation for
these environmentally “abstract claims.” Although recent studies have shown
that the damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon explosion is not, to date, as
extensive as originally projected,169 this contentious research has nevertheless
revealed that its harmful effects have certainly been substantial enough to
question the continued exclusion of compensation claims like “use and
enjoyment of,” or “devaluation of,” contaminated land.170 For example, the
conservative estimates suggest that twenty-six percent of the oil spilled by the
Deepwater Horizon either washed ashore or remained in a form that could
cause further damage to Gulf Coast shorelines.171 Despite such a relatively
small percentage, that total equals “more than 53 million gallons of oil, five
times the size of the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska.”172
Specifically, the Deepwater Horizon disaster substantially impacted the
Gulf Coast states, especially Louisiana and Florida. Releasing more than 185
million gallons of oil into the proximate waters, it affected fishing and tourism
166

See E.H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS 346 (2001). The 1992 Convention “applies exclusively” to “pollution damage”
caused in specific areas of the sea. 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III. “Pollution damage” is defined as either
the

AND

loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge
of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation
for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken
or “the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.” Id. art. II(3).
167 BRANS, supra note 166, at 346.
168 Id. Instead, as addressed in supra note 166, environmental compensation is limited in the 1992 CLC
solely to compensation for “costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be
undertaken.” 1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. II(3).
169 Gillis & Kaufman, supra note 2.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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industries, the economy, and the surrounding environment.173 The devastating
spill threatened eight national parks,174 more than 8,000 species of plants and
animals, and several thousand marine species.175 Only sixteen percent of the oil
dispersed naturally, and only seventeen percent was confined using
containment equipment.176 The Gulf of Mexico is projected to prove more
resistant than originally anticipated (based on comparisons to the Ixtoc I
disaster177), but much of this resiliency has been credited to the Gulf’s
ecological conditions, and not to the spill’s limited effects.178 The Gulf, at 643
quadrillion gallons, is an extremely vast and adaptive body of water—bacteria
have evolved to metabolize oil because 690,000 barrels of oil naturally seep
into the Gulf of Mexico each year, and the Gulf’s warm environment
encourages these bacteria to metabolize the oil.179 Thus, the Gulf of Mexico’s
resilience is not applicable to oil pollution disasters that occur in other bodies
of water; rather its resilience was specific to this accident.180 Had such a
massive spill occurred in a less resilient ocean, the result could have been more
disastrous and deleterious to the environment. It is therefore possible that these
claims concerning the devaluation of land, as well as the use and enjoyment of
it, may soon be included either as amendments to the 1992 CLC or in a new,
global treaty regulating oil pollution from fixed platforms. Part III.D below
considers whether such proposals for a new treaty are relevant and actionable
under international law.
3. Inapplicability of Private Compensation Regimes to Some States
Finally, a massive oil spill like the Deepwater Horizon reminds the
international community that, because some operators are restricted by
domestic laws that bar them from entering private compensation funds or
regimes like OPOL, these regimes can never truly bridge this gap in
international law or provide a comprehensive, unified system of compensation
for those injured by offshore operators. For example, in 1990, the United States
173 Gulf Coast Oil Spill: One Year Later, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.npca.org/
oilspill (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
174 Id.
175 THOMAS C. SHIRLEY ET AL., BIODIVERSITY OF THE GULF OF MEXICO: APPLICATIONS TO THE DEEP
HORIZON OIL SPILL 1 (2010).
176 Gillis & Kaufman, supra note 2.
177 See infra Part III.C.1.
178 John McQuaid, The Legacy of the Gulf Spill: What To Expect for the Future?, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug.
9, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2302.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).181 This domestic law mandates
damage caps different from those found in private compensation regime
agreements, thus rendering OPA incompatible with such private, international
agreements.182 Unlike the specifically tailored private compensation regimes of
IOPC and OPOL, OPA applies both to the owners, operators, or charterers of
vessels and to the lessees or permit-holders of offshore facilities.183 Under the
statute, liability per spill can reach up to $22 million for tankers, $75 million
plus clean up costs for offshore platforms, and $350 million for onshore
facilities and deep-water ports.184 Additionally, individual states can increase a
violator’s liability through added state regulations, thus providing for possibly
unlimited liability for operators of tankers and platforms if they pollute in U.S.
waters.185 OPA also does not permit parties liable for gross negligence to
benefit from its limited liability scheme.186 Domestic enforcement
mechanisms, through civil, administrative, and criminal penalties (in the form
of both fines and imprisonment), are also available through OPA.187
Because the United States originally decried the CLC’s imposed liability
caps and narrow application, yet subsequently implemented a similar structure
through OPA,188 international lawyers have criticized OPA for enabling largescale transporters and facilities (as well as oil companies owning cargo but not
facilities) to escape legal liability for major spills.189 Despite the possibility for
increased limits compared to private compensation regimes, OPA is still not
comprehensive enough to scare operators of oil facilities into “taking all

181

33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006); Faure & Hui, supra note 82, at 246; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2704.
Michael A. de Gennaro, Oil Pollution Liability and Control Under International Maritime Law:
Market Incentives as an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265, 269, 272
(2004); see also 33 U.S.C. § 2704; 1992 Fund, supra note 14, art. VI(3).
183 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32); see also de Gennaro, supra note 182, at 273; Larry Schnapf, Oil Pollution
Control Act: An Overview for the Business Lawyer, BUS. L. TODAY (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/blt/content/2010/10/0002a.pdf.
184 33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(a)(1), (3), (4); see also Schnapf, supra note 183, at 2.
185 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a); see also de Gennaro, supra note 182, at 272, 275; Browne Lewis, It’s Been 4380
Days and Counting Since Exxon Valdez: Is It Time To Change the Oil Pollution Act of 1990?, 15 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 97, 109 (2001); Schnapf, supra note 183, at 3. However, only eleven states have elected to supplement
OPA’s regulation scheme with unlimited liability statutes. Id.
186 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A); see also de Gennaro, supra note 182, at 275. Without access to OPA’s
limited liability, parties guilty of gross negligence could be responsible for the full value of the damages. Id.
187 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(6), (7); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); see also Schnapf, supra note 183, at 7–8.
188 De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 269.
189 For example, despite the fact that in 2003 Exxon Mobil was the “largest transporter of oil on world
oceans,” OPA was incapable of rendering complete compensation for the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. at 273
n.15.
182
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possible precautions to prevent spills.”190 Importantly, OPA, like the private
compensation regimes, does not entertain proper economic incentives for
operators to monitor and regulate oil pollution.191 For example, BP earned
approximately $14 billion in gross profits in 2009.192 Under OPA’s liability
scheme,193 the maximum liability that the United States could impose upon BP
equals only a small percentage of one year of BP’s profit. By impacting such a
minimal fraction of BP’s overall profit margin, OPA provides little economic
incentive for oil operators to implement potentially costly, yet needed, safety
and regulatory measures that could help prevent, or at least reduce, the
disastrous consequences of massive oil spills like the Deepwater Horizon.
Additionally, domestic pollution regulation (which relies on individual
states’ domestic laws), like OPA, eliminates the possibility of creating a
“single forum for adjudicating damage claims” from offshore drilling
pollution.194 It inherently engenders enforceability problems concerning
“conflicting laws, forum shopping, and other related enforcement problems”
both globally and domestically.195 Conflicts between two countries with
differing liability schemes—for example, one imposing strict liability and the
other unlimited liability—would increase the desire to forum shop for the most
favorable jurisdiction, evade proper yet unfavorable jurisdiction, or commit
other such hedging actions. Therefore, if individual states each create their own
pollution liability statutes (like the United States did with OPA), it becomes
increasingly difficult to adopt an effective, globally recognized standard of
liability, enforcement, or punishment.
The U.S. Congress, by enacting OPA, failing to preempt state law, and
declining to join onto a more standardized definition of liability (as found in
private compensation regimes like IOPC or OPOL) left its individual states
without a concrete and comprehensive standard by which to establish
jurisdiction over foreign operators who pollute U.S. waters.196 In addition, state
courts, due to administrative and legal expenses, delay in the judicial process,
190

Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
192 BP Delivers on Promises in “Very Good” 2009 as 4Q Profits Jump 70 Per Cent, BP (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.bp.com/extendedgenericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7059471.
193 See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
194 De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 275.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 277; see also Damon L. Vickers, Deterrence or Prevention—Two Means of Environmental
Protection: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Oregon Senate Bill 242, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
405, 421 (1992).
191
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and difficulty in obtaining original jurisdiction over foreign parties in order to
compel foreign violators to submit to individual state liability statutes, truly
provide little enforcement power under OPA.197 Therefore, without more
stringent measures, individual domestic laws, like OPA, will neither deter
operators of vessels and platforms from investing in risky ventures nor prevent
them from cutting back on safety measures for their facilities.
Thus, private compensation regimes fail to provide an adequate or
comprehensive solution for the gap in international law that leaves open
regulation of oil pollution from fixed platforms. By allowing for only moderate
compensation caps, regimes like IOPC and OPOL are forced to become
“reactive.” In response to major oil disasters, these regimes must amend their
agreements and increase their requisite liability caps so as to sufficiently cover
the most recent disasters. Additionally, individual states often pass domestic
laws that conflict with the regulations of these private compensation regimes,
rendering it impossible for the voluntary agreements of IOPC and OPOL to
become a globally comprehensive and effective liability scheme. Such
domestic laws of these individual states further create inconsistencies in
liability standards, weakening the overall effectiveness of private
compensation regimes. Because private compensation regimes have proven
unsuccessful in fully regulating oil pollution from fixed platforms, it is
necessary to look next at the Deepwater Horizon spill’s impact on international
treaties as well as to examine a potential global treaty’s ability to fill this gap in
international law.
C. The Deepwater Horizon’s Effect on International Law
1. Disasters with International Implications, Caused by Offshore Oil
Platforms, Prior to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster
Because private compensation regimes have, overall, proven ineffective,
and because this Comment aims to prove that a global treaty is the most
effective mechanism to regulate disasters as influential as the Deepwater
Horizon, this Comment now looks to a similar disaster to reveal the analogous
lack of guiding, international treaties. The international prevalence of offshore
drilling platforms has steadily increased in the last thirty years.198 As the
number of existing offshore platforms increases in the international
197
198

De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 277.
See Cates, supra note 43, at 691.
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community, the risk of pollution from these newly built platforms rises
correlatively. For example, in recent history, there have been oil platform
explosions in the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Persian Gulf.199 The
extensive oil pollution caused by such platform explosions has revealed that
“transboundary pollution in the marine environment of neighboring nations” is
now a real threat to the international environment.200
For example, in 1977, Ixtoc I, an oil platform operated by a private
Mexican contractor under contract with a Mexican national oil company,
exploded in the Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico.201 Ixtoc I released more
than 3 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, and the resulting damage
had international implications.202 Although the oil came from a Mexican-run
oil platform, the pollution still extended far enough to injure the fishing and
tourism industries of Texas, as well as the surrounding environment.203
Mexico, however, avoided suit in U.S. domestic courts because it was able to
rely on U.S. foreign sovereign immunity rules.204
Due to the lack of relevant international treaties addressing oil spills from
platforms, the United States could not sue Mexico in an international tribunal
for the extensive environmental and economic damage that Ixtoc I caused.205
Although UNCLOS directly addresses the possibility of oil pollution from
fixed platforms, it leaves the codification of applicable laws to individual
States and thereby lacks the international mechanism necessary for effectively
regulating oil pollution.206 More specifically, the United States could not sue
Mexico under UNCLOS because:
1.

199

There exists no international responsibility which anyone
could exercise against Mexico for the blowout of Ixtoc I in
terms of conventional international law.

See id.
Id.
201 Id. at 692.
202 Id.; BP’s Gulf Battle Echoes Monster ’79 Oil Spill, REUTERS, May 24, 2010, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64N57U20100524.
203 Cates, supra note 43, at 692; James E. Fender, Note, Trouble Over Oiled Waters:—Pollution Litigation
or Arbitration—The Ixtoc I Oil Well Blow-Out, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 281, 282–83 (1980).
204 BP’s Gulf Battle Echoes Monster ’79 Oil Spill, supra note 202.
205 C. Richard Bath, Mexico, the United States and Selected Law of the Sea Issues, 35 INTER-AM. ECON.
AFF. 1, 21 (1981).
206 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes.
200
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2.

No article on conventional international law obligates
Mexico to pay any reparations to a state because of pollution
caused by Ixtoc I.
....
5. To this date there exist 33 international conventions
covering marine pollution, but none of them apply to Ixtoc I.
Therefore, there is no existing international law that is
applicable.
....
7. UNCLOS III asserts that it is the sovereign right of each
state to exploit its natural resources in conformity with the
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.
Mexico has made every effort, at extreme cost, to contain
the blowout to avoid damage to marine ecology or to other
states. In so doing, Mexico has complied with international
207
law.

Therefore, at the time of the Ixtoc I disaster, no international law or treaty
specifically dictated fault or regulatory procedures that could directly apply to
a platform-based oil spill with international implications; only domestic law,
under which Mexico was able to avoid suit,208 would have applied.
2. Deepwater Horizon’s Detrimental Impact on the International
Environment Demands an International Treaty
In the wake of the damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon, those injured
by the disaster, like those affected by Ixtoc I, sought an international avenue
through which they could delegate both liabilities and compensation. However,
as discussed in Parts I.A and I.B above, no international treaty to date
specifically and effectively addresses this issue. As was the case with Ixtoc I,
UNCLOS refers to ramifications for oil pollution from fixed platforms, yet still
fails to provide an international mechanism for regulating oil pollution.209 As
this Comment has shown, the devastating and far-reaching damages of the
Deepwater Horizon disaster cannot be adequately regulated by the
compensation schemes of private compensation regimes like IOPC and
OPOL.210 As long as such regimes maintain low liability caps, they will remain
reactive regimes incapable of handling larger oil disasters.211 Additionally, the
207
208
209
210
211

Bath, supra note 205, at 19–20.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
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preclusion of some parties from joining private compensation regimes, due to
the incompatibility of their states’ domestic laws with the regulations of the
regimes, forfeits these regimes’ ability to solve comprehensively the gap in
international regulation.212 Therefore, as the Deepwater Horizon incident has
helped to reveal, this gap in regulation can be completely satisfied only by
creating that which is so evidently missing: an international treaty that (1)
strictly regulates pollution specifically from fixed platforms, and (2) develops a
framework for implementing such regulation.
The international community has already begun to address this need for an
international treaty specifically tailored to fixed platforms. Prior to the
Deepwater Horizon spill, leading petroleum agencies had planned to hold a
conference in 2011, in Portland, Oregon, to discuss regulation of oil production
in the Arctic.213 The American Petroleum Institute and several other U.S.
agencies were conference sponsors, and the main emphasis of the conference
was set to center on preparations for drilling in the Arctic.214 However, upon
realizing the extensive damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon, the agenda
of the conference was rumored likely to change to discuss ways to regulate
better and prevent international disasters caused by oil leaking from fixed
platforms;215 however, although the conference did spend a considerable
portion of its time discussing the Deepwater Horizon spill, the schedule of the
conference did not specifically address fixed platforms.216 Currently, rather
than simply relying on an express agreement like a multilateral treaty, some
countries (including Norway, Britain, France, and Germany) have volunteered
assistance and equipment in order to aid the United States’ recovery after the
Deepwater Horizon spill.217 By beginning this discussion of a more global
alternative by possibly altering the agenda at the Arctic conference, these oil
agencies have recognized the inadequacy of the current standards, at least at
some level. Therefore, the Deepwater Horizon’s pervasive economic and
financial impact has already begun to modify the desire for a multinational
agreement concerning liability for pollution from fixed platforms, and this
action will hopefully catalyze a codified, far-reaching system regulating oil
pollution from such fixtures.
212

See supra Part III.B.3.
Galbraith, supra note 1.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.; IOSC 2011 Program and Schedule Information, INT’L OIL SPILL CONF., http://iosc.org/program_
schedule.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
217 Galbraith, supra note 1.
213
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D. A Proposal for an International Treaty Imposing Strict Liability
The Deepwater Horizon disaster clearly evidenced the need for an
international treaty that effectively resolves the conflicting liabilities operators
face for oil pollution from fixed, offshore platforms. The most effective
proposal to regulate such environmental hazards, offered as a solution to better
regulate accidents like the Deepwater Horizon, advises that states convene at
an international conference to create a global treaty that would rely on the
theory of strict liability and that would be applicable in all zones of the sea.218
The treaty would apply to any state party that maintains jurisdiction over an
operating, offshore oil platform, and be an instructive guide following the
aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.219
1. Strict Liability Under the Treaty
A global treaty governing fixed platforms must impose strict liability upon
the operators of platforms to regulate effectively pollution stemming from
these facilities.220 The tort theory of strict liability is based on the premise that
a party who “undertakes an ‘abnormally dangerous activity’”221 should be held
responsible for “liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to
harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something
safe.”222 The doctrine holds those who created the risk strictly accountable
because that person is “best able to predict and allocate the risk of loss” and
“can spread loss through slightly higher prices to consumers whereas an
innocent victim cannot.”223 Classic examples of strict liability in tort are found
in legislation for explosives and the handling of ultra-hazardous substances.224
Because the drilling of oil is an abnormally dangerous activity—as evidenced
by the extensive damage caused by disasters like the Ixtoc I and Deepwater
Horizon explosions—it follows that those working with fixed platforms for the
purpose of drilling oil should be held strictly liable for any damage caused,
regardless of the operators’ negligence or lack thereof.225

218

Cates, supra note 43, at 693.
Id.
220 See id.; Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 34.
221 Cates, supra note 43, at 702.
222 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009).
223 Cates, supra note 43, at 703.
224 See generally M. Stuart Madden, Strict Products Liability Under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A: “Don’t Throw out the Baby with the Bathwater,” 10 TOURO L. REV. 123 (1993).
225 Cates, supra note 43, at 703.
219
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Additionally, one important source of international law, “the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations,”226 also indicates that strict
liability is applicable to fixed platform regulation. For example, several states
in the United States have passed domestic laws that label the drilling of oil on
land as “abnormally dangerous.”227 California, concerned that the “drilling of
an oil well is an ultra hazardous activity because it necessarily involves the risk
of serious harm to lands, waters, fish, wildlife, and personal property of
others,” classified the drilling for oil on land as an “abnormally dangerous
activity.”228 Offshore drilling on fixed platforms raises concerns analogous to
those presented by California, and thus offshore platform activity should also
be governed by strict liability rules. The Deepwater Horizon and Ixtoc I
accidents have proven that oil pollution from offshore drilling can have
devastating and far-reaching effects upon the environment, fishing and tourism
industries, and property interests which reach beyond mere national concerns.
Therefore, parties participating in offshore oil drilling, inseparably related to
those in landed oil drilling—which several states have already recognized as
“abnormally dangerous”229—should also be held strictly and internationally
liable for possible, future pollution incidents.
Currently enforceable regional treaties concerning the regulation of oil
pollution also lend credence to the proposal that parties participating in

226

ICJ Statute, supra note 40, art. 38. The statute provides four categories of sources in international law:
(1) The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
(2) This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto.

Id. “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are those principles that “emanate from
principles endorsed by the developed domestic legal systems of different states.” G.M. DANILENKO, LAWMAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 177 (1993).
227 Madden, supra note 224; Cates, supra note 43, at 702; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8670.67.5 (West
2011); Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
228 David J. Walmsley, Oil Pollution Problems Arising out of Exploitation of the Continental Shelf: The
Santa Barbara Disaster, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 514, 550 (1972); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8670.67.5 (West
2011).
229 Walmsley, supra note 228, at 550.
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offshore drilling be held strictly liable for their operations.230 The 1976
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore
Operations (the “1976 Convention”) is applicable only to states bordering the
North Sea, Baltic Sea, or North Atlantic Ocean, yet it provides an excellent
model for holding parties strictly liable for offshore drilling operations.231 This
regional treaty utilizes the theory of strict liability for oil pollution from fixed
platforms and holds operators strictly liable for any transnational damage that
may be caused by oil that escapes from an “installation.”232 Importantly, an
“installation” is defined as “any well or other facility, whether fixed or mobile,
which is used for the purpose of exploring for . . . crude oil from the seabed or
its subsoil.”233 The treaty covers pollution that occurs under the jurisdiction of
a Controlling State.234 It affects the “territory, including the internal waters and
territorial sea, of a State Party or in the areas in which, in accordance with
international law, it has sovereign rights over natural resources.”235 The
operator may escape some or all liability only in extremely exceptional
circumstances, such as: (1) if damage “resulted from an act of war, hostilities,
civil war, insurrection, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable
and irresistible character,”236 (2) if the well had been abandoned for more than
five years prior to the accident, or (3) if the damage was caused by the
victim.237
2. Jurisdictional Extent of the Treaty
In addition to concerns with levels and degrees of liability, it is also
important to consider the extent to which a treaty on pollution from fixed
platforms should extend its jurisdiction. By proposing a treaty that is global,
230

Cates, supra note 43, at 697.
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations art. 18, done May 1,
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1450 [hereinafter 1976 Convention]; see also Cates, supra note 43, at 697.
232 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 3(1); see also Cates, supra note 43, at 703–04. The treaty
defines an “operator” as “the person, whether licensee or not, designated as operator for the purposes of this
Convention by the Controlling State, or, in the absence of such designation, the person who is in overall
control of the activities carried on at the installation.” 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 1(3). The
“Controlling State” is “the State party which exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring for and
exploiting the resources of the seabed and its subsoil in the area in or above which the installation is situated.”
1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 1(4).
233 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 1(2)(a); see also Bernard A. Dubais, 1976 London Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations, 9 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 61, 64 (1977).
234 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 2.
235 Id.
236 Id. arts. 3(3)–(5).
237 Id.
231
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rather than regional, in nature, the treaty’s application is no longer limited to
those areas “under the direct jurisdiction of individual states,” but rather allows
the treaty to hold parties strictly liable for damage that they may cause in any
zone of the sea.238 Scholars have previously argued that a global convention
that regulates fixed platforms and extends its jurisdiction beyond that of its
party states is unnecessary because:
Great geographical differences between various regions make efforts
towards global cooperation both extremely complicated and
unnecessary. As the presence of oil rigs and assorted platforms seems
to be most evident in coastal waters the pollution problems they
cause are better tackled by regional agreements that take into account
239
the different conditions of any particular area.

However, as Kissi Agyebeng points out, UNCLOS was passed as a global
treaty that, as such, regulates activities that occur anywhere in the entirety of
the oceans.240 The success of UNCLOS, therefore, is instructive that treaties
regulating pollution on an international scale is, in fact, achievable. A treaty
like UNCLOS thus exists as a model for a global fixed platform treaty.
By creating a treaty which can both (1) regulate pollution from offshore
platforms in maritime zones not traditionally covered by regional treaties or
national jurisdiction, and at the same time can (2) mandate strict liability and a
concrete definition of the instances in which parties are liable, this newly
proposed treaty can eliminate the fundamental problems engendered in
UNCLOS. Liability then would no longer be left to the discretion of individual
states; rather, the treaty would engender a “binding and uniform civil liability
regime with global reach for pollution damage resulting from offshore
operations.”241
As previously stated, the Deepwater Horizon explosion released oil into the
surrounding waters and environment, affecting approximately 68,000 square
miles of ocean.242 The extent of this maritime reach equaled approximately the
size of Oklahoma.243 During the height of the disaster, the explosion’s
repercussions extended to the U.S. federal water boundaries, or the U.S.
238

Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5.
MARIA GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 43 (1995) (citations omitted).
240 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5. See also supra Part I.B for a description of UNCLOS and its
inadequate treatment and jurisdictional aspects of offshore facilities.
241 Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5.
242 Gillis, supra note 141.
243 Id.
239
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EEZ.244 In fact, more than a third of the Gulf of Mexico’s EEZ was closed to
fishing during the summer of 2010 due to dangerous environmental concerns
caused by the Deepwater Horizon spill.245 The expansive effects of the disaster
therefore reveal that an accident caused by a fixed platform could easily extend
beyond the maritime jurisdiction of a state. If another state’s jurisdiction does
not overlap or meet that state’s jurisdiction, and if pollution were to seep
beyond an EEZ into the high seas, a global treaty that did not cover all zones of
the sea would allocate some pollution left by a fixed platform outside the
jurisdiction of the treaty and leave little or no incentive for a responsible party
to repair the damage. Therefore, it is imperative that a global, uniform, and
jurisdictionally all-encompassing treaty be considered to fill this gap in
international law.
3. Parties to the Treaty
Another important aspect to consider when drafting a treaty is whom the
treaty would bind. By using the 1976 Convention, the Civil Liability
Conventions, and other similar conventions and agreements regulating oil
pollution as guides,246 individual states would be made parties to the global
treaty and operators of the offending oil platforms would remain liable for any
damage incurred by oil pollution originating from the operator’s facilities in
violation of the treaty. Although the operators would not be signatories to the
treaty, they would still be bound to the terms of the treaty as the nationals of
state parties. States often impose domestic legislation in order to codify into
their domestic law the regulations found in treaties to which states are
parties;247 here, therefore, the signatory states would impose domestic
legislation binding the operators to the terms of the global treaty. An operator
would be defined similarly to the 1976 Convention as a “person, whether
licensee or not, designated as operator for the purposes of this convention by
244 Fishery Closure Boundary as of 6pm Eastern Time 21 June 2010, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater_horizon/BP_OilSpill_FisheryClosureMap_062110.png (last
visited Oct. 22, 2011).
245 Deepwater Horizon Santa Rosa County Action Plan Update #44, OILSPILLNEWS, http://www.
oilspillnews.net/oil-spill-clean-up/deepwater-horizon-santa-rosa-county-action-plan-update-44 (last visited
Oct. 22, 2011); see also Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Fisheries Closure and Other Information, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon_oil_spill.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2011).
246 See 1976 Convention, supra note 231, pmbl.; 1969 CLC, supra note 56, pmbl.; 1992 CLC, supra note
14, pmbl.
247 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist
Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1998).
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the Controlling State, or, in the absence of such designation, the person who is
in overall control of the activities carried on at the installation.”248 States
would, therefore, not be liable for damages caused by individual operators;
instead, the treaty would hold operators located in party states liable for their
offshore operations.
4. Limits on Liability Under the Treaty
The 1976 Convention is also an instructive model on how to structure
compensation caps in an international treaty. It imposes compensation caps,
similar in theory but different in implementation, to those found in the IOPC
and OPOL agreements.249 The 1976 Convention creates a committee,
composed of one representative from each state party, which may propose at
any time to increase these liability caps.250 A vote from three-fourths of the
state party members can ratify such a proposal.251 Such a rulemaking body,
codified in the treaty, allows the treaty to handle, adaptively and more
adequately, increasingly expensive and extensive disasters caused by fixed
platforms like the Deepwater Horizon explosion. The 1976 Convention even
allows for unlimited liability in limited circumstances:
1. This Convention shall not prevent a State from providing for
unlimited liability or a higher limit of liability than that currently
applicable under Article 6 for pollution damage caused by
installations for which it is the Controlling State and suffered in that
State or in another State Party; provided however that in so doing it
shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality. Such provision may
be based on the principle of reciprocity.
2. The courts of each State Party shall apply the law of the
Controlling State in order to determine whether the operator is
entitled under the provisions of this Article and paragraph 1 of
Article 6 to limit his liability, and, if so, the amount of such
252
liability.

This model evidences that it is certainly possible for parties to be held fully
liable for damage caused by their installations. Its adaptive amendment
structure—although seemingly similar to what the “reactive” private

248
249
250
251
252

See 1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 1(3).
Id. art. 6; see Dubais, supra note 233, at 66.
1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 9; see also Dubais, supra note 233, at 66.
1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 9; see also Dubais, supra note 233, at 66.
1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 15; see also Dubais, supra note 233, at 73.
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compensation regimes have historically done in response to large pollution
disasters—would be easier to implement because the treaty codifies a
committee to recommend amendments.253 This scheme would therefore be
ideal for a global treaty regulating oil pollution from offshore platforms.
5. Provisions for Non-economic Damages Under the Treaty
In addition to provisions that mandate strict liability, global jurisdiction
over the sea, and compensation caps that can be amended by super-majority
vote, a global treaty that properly regulates oil pollution from fixed platforms
must also provide compensation for victims for both economic and noneconomic damages. As discussed above, current compensation schemes
provide only for economic damages suffered by victims of oil pollution.254
However, the Deepwater Horizon disaster and its devastating impact on the
Gulf of Mexico’s tourism, fishing, and environmental industries have clearly
indicated the substantial impact a massive oil spill from a fixed platform can
have on the “use and enjoyment of” or “devaluation of” land.255
It is therefore imperative to define “pollution” in this global treaty so as to
include “devaluation of land” and the loss of “use and enjoyment of land.” The
1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund currently limit the definition of “pollution
damage” to include only the “costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement
actually undertaken or to be undertaken,”256 and thus fail to provide adequate
compensation for these “abstract claims” that spills like the Deepwater
Horizon disaster clearly can and do create.257 To compensate victims
effectively and fully, a global treaty must therefore provide for instances when
land can no longer be enjoyed as a tourist beach, a fishing location, or wildlife
habitat. Without defining “pollution damage” to include these non-economic,
“abstract claims,” a global treaty regulating oil pollution from fixed platforms
will still fail to leave victims fully recovered after massive oil disasters.
6. Summary Remarks
By (1) holding parties strictly liable for their abnormally dangerous oil
drilling, (2) limiting compensation while providing a straightforward and

253
254
255
256
257

1976 Convention, supra note 231, art. 9.
See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text.
1992 CLC, supra note 14, art. III(2); see supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
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accessible means for adapting the caps, and (3) leaving an open avenue for
unlimited liability in certain instances, the 1976 Convention provides an
excellent model for an international treaty that is capable of regulating offshore
platforms and being applied globally.258 After the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
it has become readily apparent that, to help compensate victims of such
disasters, the international community needs a mechanism more effective than
the private compensation regimes. A global treaty—which imposes strict
liability on the responsible party regardless of the maritime zone to which the
damage extends, and that contains reasonable, adaptive compensation caps that
can be increased by a vote of the parties (with the possibility of unlimited
liability)—is the best solution to regulate disasters like the Deepwater Horizon
explosion. Additionally, in order to fully compensate victims and hold
operators completely liable, such a treaty must define “pollution damage” so
that operators are liable for non-economic damages, such as devaluation of
land. Fortunately, international actors have now begun to realize the need for
such a regulatory scheme.259
CONCLUSION
As the analysis above has evidenced, the regulatory schemes currently in
force, implemented by both private compensation regimes and international
treaties, fall short of addressing the crucial gap in international law concerning
pollution from fixed platforms. The staggering size of BP’s $20-billion relief
fund, established to compensate those affected by the Deepwater Horizon
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, coupled with the widespread effects of the
disaster, have emphasized the importance of filling this gap and have called
into question the methods available to seek compensation from operators of
fixed platforms. Private compensation regimes currently fail to compensate
adequately those injured by oil spills from fixed platforms, and it has become
readily apparent that contemporaneous damage caps have historically fallen
well below the requisite compensation needed to satisfy all injuries.260 Simple
increases in compensation caps in response to each new incident are not
sufficient remedies. Instead, a global treaty, imposing strict liability and
creating flexible compensation caps with the added possibility for unlimited
liability, is necessary in order to fully resolve this gap in international law.
258
259

1976 Convention, supra note 231, arts. 3, 7, 15.
E.g., Steven Lee Myers, Cooperation Is Pledged by Nations of the Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011,

at A12.
260

See supra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
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With the power of a global treaty of strict liability, which would “regulate
the entirety of the oceans”261 and encompass both the economic and noneconomic impacts of each spill, states would be able to more uniformly predict
their liability for oil pollution and could better prepare so as to avoid further
disasters from offshore platforms. Additionally, a global treaty would provide
for a consistent standard of enforcement against offending operators and would
remove any confusion concerning liability limits and compensation avenues.262
However, despite the stirrings among the international community for a
multinational treaty that directly addresses pollution from offshore platforms,
the most likely, although less preferable, outcome is a simple increase in
compensation caps for private compensation regimes.263 Realistically, although
a treaty would more successfully create uniformity in pollution and liability
standards, it is unlikely that all states would sign a strict liability treaty that
would include provisions on compensation caps. The convention and
subsequent treaty would likely, however, garner sufficient approval to be
relatively effective, because it would concern the narrow, and thus “feasible,”
topic of oil pollution from offshore platforms.264 However, some states, like
the United States, have imposed domestic laws (such as OPA) that are
incompatible with liability caps.265 These states would be unable to adhere to
such a treaty without repealing their domestic laws, a highly unlikely outcome.
To make this treaty more palatable to states like the United States, it would
have to allow for significant reservations to certain portions of the treaty,
particularly the liability caps, so that the treaty would not violate current
domestic laws. However, too many reservations from the treaty would negate
its necessary purpose of creating a uniform, global standard of liability for
regulation of oil pollution from fixed platforms.
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, in order to regulate offshore
platform pollution, the international community will, probably and regrettably,
continue its historical trend and converge on an imperfect solution. The
international community will likely further increase the private compensation

261

Agyebeng, supra note 117, at 5.
See id. at 33.
263 Historically, private compensation regimes have simply increased their compensation caps in response
to major oil disasters from both fixed platforms and tankers. See Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2. The hurdles to create
and affirm a global treaty are likely too steep to be overcome at this juncture, but, inevitably, only a global
treaty will fully bridge this gap in international law.
264 Cates, supra note 43, at 707–08.
265 De Gennaro, supra note 182, at 6.
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regime compensation caps, with potentially a greater percentage increase in the
wake of the $20-billion compensation funds allocated for the Deepwater
Horizon spill.266 However, without a global treaty enforcing clear and uniform
regulations, accidents like the Deepwater Horizon will continue to leave states
without sufficient direction. States will continue to implement varying systems
that regulate potential international disasters from fixed platforms, and this
ambiguity will leave victims without full and due compensation for their
injuries.
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